Realism and critique in economics: An interview with Lars P. Syll by Morgan, JA & Syll, LP
real-world economics review, issue no. 88 
subscribe for free 
 
60 
 
Realism and critique in economics: an interview with 
Lars P. Syll 
Lars P. Syll and Jamie Morgan   [Malmö University, Sweden; Leeds Becket University, UK] 
 
Copyright: Lars P. Syll and Jamie Morgan 2019  
You may post comments on this paper at  
https://rwer.wordpress.com/comments-on-rwer-issue-no-88/ 
 
 
Lars Pålsson Syll is Professor of Social Science, Malmö University, Sweden. He holds two 
PhDs awarded in the 1990s. One in economic history and another in economics. His regular 
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Michael Hudson).
1
 His postings and publications have drawn on and drawn attention to the 
continued relevance of Keynes, the work of post-Keynesians, and the scope and potential of 
modern monetary theory. However, he is perhaps best known for his criticism of the 
methodological foundations of mainstream economics. His book On the use and misuse of 
theories and models in mainstream economics (2016) is published by WEA.  
 
His work can be accessed at: https://larspsyll.wordpress.com       
 
He is interviewed by Jamie Morgan for RWER ….     
 
Jamie: Lars, perhaps a useful place to start would be with some introductory comment on 
what informs your reasoning. Whilst your postings range across many subjects you regularly 
return to a common theme. Specifically, the use economists make of mathematics to express 
theory and of analytical statistical techniques to conduct research. What are the key problems 
you see here and in what sense can or should matters of methodology provide a common 
thread to this common theme?  
 
LPS: Well, I think the main problem here when it comes to applying mathematics and 
inferential statistics to economics is that mainstream economists usually do not start by 
asking themselves if the ontology – real-world economies and societies – is constituted in a 
way that makes it possible to explain, understand or forecast our economies and societies 
with the kind of models and theories that mathematics and inferential statistics supply. The 
basic fault with modern mainstream economics, in my view, is that the concepts and models it 
uses – often borrowed from mathematics, physics, and statistics – are incompatible with the 
very objects of economic study. The analytical instruments borrowed from the natural 
sciences and mathematics were constructed and used for totally different issues and 
problems. This has fundamentally contributed to the non-correspondence between the 
structure of economic science and the structure of real-world economies. And I think it may 
also be one of the main reasons why economists so often have come up with doubtful – and 
sometimes harmful – oversimplifications and generalizations.  
 
Using simplifying tractability assumptions – rational expectations, common knowledge, 
linearity, ergodicity, etc. – because otherwise one cannot “manipulate” the models or come up 
with rigorous and precise predictions and explanations, does not really exempt economists 
from having to justify their modelling choices. Being able to manipulate things in models 
cannot be enough to warrant a methodological choice. Take, for example, the discussion on 
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rational expectations as a modelling assumption. Those who want to build macroeconomics 
on microfoundations usually maintain that the only robust policies are those based on rational 
expectations and representative actor models. As I tried to show in my book On the use and 
misuse of theories and models in mainstream economics (2016) there is really no support for 
this conviction at all. If microfounded macroeconomics has nothing to say about the real world 
and the economic problems out there, why should we care about it? The final court of appeal 
for economic models should not be if we – once the tractability assumptions are made – can 
manipulate them. As long as no convincing justification is put forward for how the inferential 
bridging is made, mainstream model building is little more than hand-waving. 
 
Mathematics can be an excellent tool for constructing models. But – it should never become a 
goal in itself. Most mainstream economists construct mathematical theories and models for 
the purpose of being able to deliver purportedly rigorous deductions that may somehow be 
exportable to the real world. By analysing a few causal factors in their “laboratories” they hope 
they can perform thought experiments and observe how these factors operate on their own 
and without impediments or confounders. But it does not – at least not as far as I can see – 
work. Causes have to be set in a contextual structure to be able to operate. Instead of 
incorporating structures that are true to the real world, the settings made in economic models 
are standardly based on mathematical tractability. In the models, they often appear as 
unrealistic tractability assumptions, usually playing a decisive role in getting the deductive 
machinery to deliver precise and rigorous results. This, of course, makes exporting to the 
real-world problematic, since these models are thought to deliver general and far-reaching 
conclusions that are externally valid. But how can we be sure the lessons learned in these 
theories and models have external validity when based on highly specific and unrealistic 
assumptions? As a rule, the more specific and concrete the structures, the less generalizable 
the results. Admitting that we in principle can move from falsehoods in theories and models to 
truth in the real world does not take us very far unless a thorough explanation of the relation 
between theory, model and the real world is made – and to just have a deductive warrant for 
things happening in a mathematical model is no guarantee for them being preserved when 
applied to the real world (see for example, Freedman, 2010). 
 
In my view, what is wrong with mainstream economics is not that it employs models. What is 
wrong is that it employs poor models. They – and the mathematical-logical tractability 
assumptions on which they to a large extent build – are poor because they do not bridge to 
the real world in which we live. 
 
Now, in mathematics, the deductive-axiomatic method has worked just fine. But science is not 
mathematics. As far as I can see, conflating those two domains of knowledge has been one 
of the most fundamental mistakes made in modern economics. It has made economics both 
narrow and hopelessly irrelevant.  
 
Let me just round off this already far too long answer to your question with some remarks 
more specifically on the use of inferential statistics in economics. 
 
As a critical realist, I must confess to not being surprised to find that an approach that – like 
econometrics – presupposes a closed system, fails when it is applied to essentially open 
systems such as real-world economies. Although the mathematical-statistical theory upon 
which it builds presupposes the existence of stable parametric relations, the identified 
relations are almost always unstable. Simply assuming that you can model social and 
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economic relations with mathematical-statistical functions, is not a recipe for being able to 
contribute explanations of real-world phenomena and structures. 
 
Limiting model assumptions in science always have to be closely examined since if we are 
going to be able to show that the mechanisms or causes that we isolate and handle in our 
models are stable in the sense that they do not change when we export them to our “target 
systems”, we have to be able to show that they do not only hold under ceteris paribus 
conditions and so are of only limited value to our understanding of the real world. Now, I 
would maintain, the kinds of laws and relations that econometrics has established, are laws 
and relations about entities in models that presuppose causal mechanisms that are atomistic 
and additive. When causal mechanisms operate in the real-world they, however, only do it in 
ever-changing and unstable combinations where the whole is more than a mechanical sum of 
parts. If economic regularities obtain they do so, as a rule, only because we engineered them 
for that purpose. Outside man-made “nomological machines” they are rare, or even non-
existent. Unfortunately, that also makes most of the achievements of econometrics – as most 
of the contemporary endeavours of mainstream economic theoretical modelling – rather 
useless. 
 
In my view, economics should be a science in the true knowledge business, and so I remain a 
sceptic of the pretenses and aspirations of econometrics. Its ever-higher technical 
sophistication in no way makes up for the lack of serious under-labouring of its deeper 
philosophical and methodological foundations. Economists who consider it “fruitful to believe” 
in the possibility of treating unique economic data as the observable results of random 
drawings from an imaginary sampling of an imaginary population are skating on thin ice. 
 
Jamie: As you say, a (“long”) thorough answer. However, it does create something of an 
issue that begs answers that are as much sociological as they are methodological. You state: 
 
“This, of course, makes exporting to the real-world problematic, since these 
models are thought to deliver general and far-reaching conclusions that are 
externally valid. But how can we be sure the lessons learned in these 
theories and models have external validity when based on highly specific and 
unrealistic assumptions? As a rule, the more specific and concrete the 
structures, the less generalizable the results. Admitting that we in principle 
can move from falsehoods in theories and models to truth in the real world do 
not take us very far unless a thorough explanation of the relation between 
theory, model and the real world is made…”  
 
Your main point focuses on mismatch between mathematical and statistical forms and the 
reality investigated – inducing failure of adequate description and of explanation and 
prediction (if prediction is ever possible). Consider, a member of the public may well in the 
modern world be sceptical of “expertise” but this applies to all purveyors of knowledge that 
have influence. A great deal is made of post-truth etc. At the same time, in general it makes 
no sense to deny good faith (good intentions) to experts. A mainstream economist, just like 
you, has a sense of self, an identity. It would be unreasonable to assume they collectively do 
not care about the status of what it is they produce. Like any other field, the majority have 
integrity and would not be able to do what they do if they did not in some sense consider it a 
contribution to “knowledge”. Moreover, as we are all aware, mainstream economists come in 
many forms, with a range of socio-political affiliations. They are not mere ideologists who all 
conform to the same political position in the same way, which then provides some reason to 
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deform or subvert the use (misuse) of theory. And, mainstream economists have and 
continue to have (criticisms not withstanding) great power and influence in the world (a valued 
skillset that in most countries makes them amongst the highest paid university graduates). To 
a member of the public it must seem weird that it is possible to state, as you do, such 
fundamental criticism of an entire field of study. The perplexing issue from a third party point 
of view is how do we reconcile good intention (or at least legitimate sense of self as a 
scholar), and power and influence in the world with error, failure and falsity in some primary 
sense; given that the primary problem is methodological, the issues seem to extend in 
different ways from Milton Friedman to Robert Lucas Jr, from Paul Krugman to Joseph 
Stiglitz. Do such observations give you pause? My question (invitation) I suppose, is how 
does one reconcile (explain or account for) the direction of travel of mainstream economics: 
the degree of commonality identified in relation to its otherwise diverse parts, the glaring 
problems of that commonality – as identified and stated by you and many other critics?       
 
LPS: When politically “radical” economists like Krugman, Wren-Lewis or Stiglitz confront the 
critique of mainstream economics from people like me, they usually have the attitude that if 
the critique isn’t formulated in a well-specified mathematical model it isn’t worth taking 
seriously. To me that only shows that, despite all their radical rhetoric, these economists – 
just like Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas Jr or Greg Mankiw – are nothing but die-hard 
defenders of mainstream economics. The only economic analysis acceptable to these people 
is the one that takes place within the analytic-formalistic modelling strategy that makes up the 
core of mainstream economics. Models and theories that do not live up to the precepts of the 
mainstream methodological canon are considered “cheap talk”. If you do not follow this 
particular mathematical-deductive analytical formalism you’re not even considered to be doing 
economics. 
 
So, even though we, as you formulate it, can identify many “diverse parts” of modern 
mainstream economics, the “degree of commonality identified” comes from the non-
negotiable demand that the proliferation of models has to take place as a kind of axiomatic 
variation within the standard neoclassical model. But to me, and I guess most other heterodox 
economists, no matter how many thousands of “technical working papers” or models 
mainstream economists come up with, as long as they are just “wildly inconsistent” axiomatic 
variations of the same old mathematical-deductive ilk, they will not take us one single inch 
closer to giving us relevant and usable means to further our understanding and explanation of 
real economies. 
 
The kind of “diversity” you asked me about, is perhaps even better to get a perspective on, by 
considering someone like Dani Rodrik, who a couple of years ago wrote a book on economics 
and its modelling strategies – Economics Rules (2015) – that attracted much attention among 
economists in the academic world. Just like Krugman and the other politically “radical” 
mainstream economists, Rodrik shares the view that there is nothing basically wrong with 
standard theory. As long as policymakers and economists stick to standard economic 
analysis everything is fine. Economics is just a method that makes us “think straight” and 
“reach correct answers”. Similar to Krugman, Rodrik likes to present himself as a kind of 
pluralist anti-establishment economics iconoclast, but when it really counts, he shows what he 
is – a mainstream economist fanatically defending the relevance of standard economic 
modelling strategies. In other words – no heterodoxy where it would really count. In my view, 
this isn’t pluralism. It’s a methodological reductionist strait-jacket. 
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To me this also shows – to answer another part of your question – that the relationship 
between political/ideological views of economists and theory are not of the one-to-one kind. 
Leon Walras was a socialist. Knut Wicksell a social democrat. Paul Krugman is a political 
“radical”. But that’s not the point. A lot of my economics teachers at university in the 1970s 
and 1980s were Left party members, but they still preached neoclassical general equilibrium 
theory as if it were a gospel that had to be learned without question. To me, the political 
affiliations of these people were totally uninteresting. I am sure most of them had, as you put 
it, “good intentions” and looked upon themselves as “scholars”. But I fiercely criticized them 
then – as I do now – not because of their political/ideological views, but because they taught 
irrelevant mathematical-formalist theories and models that had nothing to do with real-life. 
The ideology that I, as an economist focusing on science-theoretical and philosophical 
aspects of economics, am interested in is not of a political kind, but rather of a methodological 
kind. And that ideology is pervasive in economics! 
 
Today we debate diversity a lot in economics in terms of what some call an “empirical 
revolution” that is said to have taken place within economics the last couple of decades (for 
example, Angrist and Pischke, 2010; Starr, 2014). It is often seen as a new kind of paradigm 
where economists in rigorous ways now try to test theories against reality, and where we can 
see a shift to empiricism away from philosophy with the use of imaginative empirical methods 
– such as natural experiments, field experiments, lab experiments, and RCTs. 
 
I don’t share that view. Why? Well, because these new methods face the same basic problem 
as theoretical models. They too are built on rather artificial conditions and have difficulties 
with external validity. If we see experiments as tests of theories or models that ultimately 
aspire to say something about the real “target system”, then the problem of external validity is 
central. By this, I do not mean to say that empirical methods are so problematic that they can 
never be used. On the contrary. I am basically, though not without reservations, in favour of 
the increased use of experiments within economics. Not least as an alternative to completely 
barren “bridge-less” axiomatic-deductive theory models. My criticism is more about aspiration 
levels and what we believe we can achieve with these tools and methods in the social 
sciences. Making appropriate extrapolations from experiments to different settings, 
populations or target systems, is not easy. “It works there” is no evidence for “it will work 
here”. Causes deduced in an experimental setting still have to show that they come with an 
export-warrant. The causal background assumptions made have to be justified, and without 
license to export, the value of “rigorous” methods and “on-average-knowledge” is despairingly 
small. 
 
I find it hard to share the uncritical enthusiasm and optimism on the value of experiments and 
all the statistical-econometric machinery that comes with it. Although different empirical 
approaches have been – more or less – integrated into mainstream economics, I would argue 
there is still a long way to go before economics has become a truly empirical science. Sure, 
the “empirical turn” has made mainstream economics more diverse, but the “commonality” 
you referred to in your question still rules the roost. It is still mostly diversity within the 
mainstream methodological straightjacket! 
 
So why do they do what they do then, these mainstream economists? And why do they still 
have so much “power and influence” in the world? 
 
Most academic economists probably do what they do because that is what they have been 
taught to do and believe in. They have – almost exclusively nowadays – been trained to learn 
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how to construct and use mathematical models, and preferably without asking if these models 
are appropriate or not for the problems at hand. Most economists today are brought up within 
the same neoclassical tradition, a tradition that looks upon economics as a kind of social 
physics and applying the same kind of methods that are used in the natural sciences. Many of 
them look upon their science as “the queen of social science” also for that reason. 
Mathematics is conceived of as being somehow “objective” and “neutral” and hence 
contributing to the scientific image of economics. And most of them are happy with just 
continuing to play along with the inherited smorgasbord of mathematical tools and models. 
They usually take for granted that being scientific means that you unquestionably have to use 
mathematics. The fruitfulness of mathematics is taken as an article of faith, and if you want to 
do serious economics, you simply have to express your ideas and theories in mathematical 
form. Mathematising physics and the natural sciences turned out to be a success in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, so it just has to (it is argued) be a success to do the same with social 
sciences and economics. 
 
To me, all this is, however, disheartening nonsense. Why? Because these guys have never 
sat down and earnestly asked themselves the one fundamental question every scientist has 
to ask herself: is the “thing” we study really of the sort that makes the methods used feasible? 
Instead, they are so eager to appear “scientific” and just take for granted – or pretend – that 
the preferred mathematical-formalist methods they use are appropriate. In my eyes, this is 
nothing but incomprehensibly and outrageously unscientific! Before any epistemological 
elaborations on models and theories are made, it should be imperative that this ontological 
question has to be posed and answered. Since modern mainstream economists almost 
without exception do not (dare to) do so, they happily go on doing what they have always 
done. But – neglected ontology returns with a vengeance! The kind of “laws” and regularities 
they come up with have no export license to the real world. The quest for “rigour” and 
“precision” in the end only turns out to be obtained at the cost of losing contact with the real 
world. The (pretended) scientific “rigour” evaporates when confronted with real-life. 
Economics has to be more than a simple intellectual exercise! Sure, you can always SAY that 
it is possible to learn things of significance about our world from constructing these kinds of 
models. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and I have still not seen a single 
convincing demonstration of HOW this is done! And for those of us who go for reliable 
knowledge and want to use economics for understanding and explaining things in the world in 
which we live, that means these “as if” model results are nothing but a useless and irrelevant 
waste of time! The (in my view perverted) allegiance to “rigour” and to a focus of scientific 
endeavour on proving things in mathematical-formal models is a gross misapprehension of 
what economics is or ought to be. The total lack of explanatory success of mainstream 
economics when it comes to things like (real-world) unemployment, structural change, 
financialization, and economic crises is a testament to the futility of building theories without 
solid ontological under-labouring! A relevant and realist economics should never give up on 
the real world and content itself with proving things about thought up worlds in “fables”, 
“parables”, “stories”, “fictions”, “narratives” or what have you. 
 
On your question of “power and influence” of economists, I do actually think mainstream 
economics has lost much of it – at least to “members of the public” – during the last decade. 
Very few people outside economics departments – rightly – take the kind of analyses that 
mainstream economists come up with seriously. And I think it has much to do with 
methodology. Mainstream economists still embrace simplistic theoretical assumptions and 
almost religious faith in mathematical techniques where real-world applicability isn’t even on 
the agenda. And even if they expand the smorgasbord of analytical models with new 
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empirical studies, that isn’t enough. The crisis of 2007-08 showed more than anything else 
that mainstream economics with all its fancy mathematical and econometric models and 
theories had no answers to the questions that the UK Queen and others posed to understand 
what happened to our economies. 
 
Today, when university students all over the world are increasingly beginning to question if 
the kind of economics they are taught – mainstream economics – is of any value, and some 
even question if economics really is a science at all, it is all-important to ask ourselves how 
we are going to proceed if we want to re-establish credence and trust in economics as a 
science (see, for example, Rethinking Economics & The New Weather Institute, 2017). 
 
For a start, I think we should stop pretending that we have exact and rigorous answers on 
everything. Because we don’t! Mainstream economists build models and theories and tell 
people that they can calculate and foresee the future. But they do this based on mathematical 
and statistical assumptions that often have little or nothing to do with reality. Then I think one 
should really reconsider the use of mathematics in economics since the kind of formalism that 
mathematics instantiates is perhaps the deepest source of the irrelevance and uselessness of 
modern economics. Mathematics gives exact answers to exact questions. But the relevant 
and interesting questions we face in the economic realm are rarely of that kind. Instead of a 
fundamentally misplaced reliance on abstract mathematical-deductive-axiomatic models 
having anything of substance to contribute to our knowledge of real economies, it would be 
far better if we pursued “thicker” models and relevant empirical studies and observations. 
Models that we already know are nothing but absurd fictions, are not the stuff that real 
science is made of! And – finally – we should end treating other social sciences as poor 
relations. We have to be more open-minded and incorporate knowledge and perspectives 
from other disciplines. Economics has long suffered from hubris, and a more broad-minded 
and multifarious science would definitely enrich today’s altogether still too introverted 
economics.  
 
Jamie: To follow up on some of what you say here and to make some additional sense of 
what I was getting at by “sociological”; if we grant that mainstream economics persists with 
theorems, methods, models and applications that are rooted in fictions and that mainstream 
economists make claims to precision or relevance that are ultimately falsely premised, this 
does not make them irrelevant nor does it imply they are without consequence. Future facts 
can be created by the (sometimes unintended) consequences of past fictions (and those 
fictions can be unrecognized falsities inaccurately considered true when false or more 
diffusely simply convenient or necessary points of departure or building blocks of model 
forms).  Economics, it seems worth emphasising, has long been caught in the tension 
between representing itself as a science that describes a fundamental economic reality that 
can then be manipulated and producing a form of theory that (inadvertently) influences the 
nature of that economic reality (it is not fundamental in a fixed sense) and advocating a form 
or forms for that economic reality. It is perhaps because of the resistance to taking ontology 
seriously that the role of economics in social reality has remained so problematic for 
economists and for societies. Mainstream economics is not without norms or advocacy, but 
does tend to assimilate these on the basis of its own (implicit) ontology and methodological 
commitments – the role of normativity itself as a constituting part of social (economic) reality 
is rarely at issue; instead norms become predicates or hypotheses to test. 
 
In any case, social (economic) reality is not a product of what is true, but rather (arguably) a 
consequence of what we do based on the complex structuring of activity that in part has 
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depended on the influence of mainstream economics. RCTs, for example, have had profound 
effects on development policy (as Martin Ravallion and others note), modern 
macroeconomics and financial theory have, as you note, played a role in financialization and 
financial crises. Here, there are various points one might make that speak to your argument 
regarding economics as “science”. You note: “The fruitfulness of mathematics is taken as an 
article of faith, and if you want to do serious economics, you simply have to express your 
ideas and theories in mathematical form.” One might elaborate that the “empirical turn” 
(including the claimed “credibility revolution”, Angrist and Pischke, 2010) has not to any great 
degree reversed a general tendency in mainstream economics to not apply standard scientific 
practice. There is a significant difference between adopting methods that one thinks are social 
science equivalents of natural science and making use of them in the same way they are 
made use of in natural science (and this is an additional point to whether in fact the adoption 
is appropriate or the understanding of natural science they are posed within is adequate – as 
Phil Mirowski or Tony Lawson or Edward Fullbrook might note; for example, Fullbrook, 2016). 
By this I mean that mainstream economics has placed increasing emphasis on empirical work 
but still pays considerably less to duplication, replication or confirmation of results (a matter 
one should not conflate with the issue of whether in fact there are problems of philosophy of 
science with falsification, confirmation etc. if thinking about positivism or empiricism). The 
American Economic Review, for example, published two sections on this problem recently 
(both May 2017, 107(5), for example, Hoffler, 2017), albeit without this making any great 
difference to the direction of travel of the mainstream (a point one might also make about the 
turn towards an ethical code for economists that the AEA has sponsored).
2
 Sociologically, 
surely this lack of focus on replication of results is one (not the only) way in which the status 
of the mainstream based on its current commitments is able to persist?  
 
More broadly, there is a complex socialisation process that might account for economists’ 
self- image and that might account for the nature of their influence in the world and how it 
persists (scepticism notwithstanding regarding expertise). Fourcade and various collaborators 
(for example, Fourcade et al, 2015) have done a lot of interesting work on this, as I am sure 
you are aware (as has, over the years, David Colander, and before his demise Fred Lee; for 
example, Colander, 2005; Colander and Klamer, 1987; Colander et al., 2005). This brings me 
to something else that perhaps you can usefully clarify, not least because it tends to confuse 
the status and consistency of critique, and that is use of the term neoclassical. Throughout 
your comments you seem to refer to neoclassical and mainstream as though the two are 
synonymous. There are those who consider this confusing for various reasons: the term had 
a particular meaning when coined by Veblen, the term was taken up by Stigler and others 
subsequently and became synonymous with Chicago School and associated thought and the 
term is often used more diffusely as a general term for mainstream economics and to imply 
an orthodoxy that is little changed (and concomitantly is sometimes used as a pejorative term 
by critics and sometimes used as a self-identification by advocates – though less today than 
in the past; see, for example, Arnsperger and Varoufakis, 2006; Morgan, 2016). I am sure I 
am not telling you anything you don’t know here since you have a deep background in the 
history of economic thought as well as an interest in philosophy of economics. But your main 
purpose has always been constructively focused on argument intended as a contribution to 
transforming economics. With this in mind and on reflection, how do you see the term 
neoclassical and your use of it? You might also want to place this in the context of pluralism – 
                                                            
2
 The May 2017 issue of American Economic Review also contains an article on abduction and one 
might think this too is significant in terms of changing face of economics; however, the term is used for 
an iterative approach to multiple modeling and hypotheses – a highly limiting understanding of what 
abduction allows.  
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what scope do you see for a more pluralistic economics and how do you see current 
tendencies in mainstream economics (in so far as instantiated in schools of thought) as part 
of that pluralism?   
 
LPS: A couple of years ago I was interviewed by a public radio journalist and we were 
discussing the monumental failures of the prediction-and-forecasting-business. But – the 
journalist asked – if these cocksure economists with their “rigorous” and “precise” 
mathematical-statistical-econometric models are so wrong again and again – “why do they 
persist wasting time on it?” Yes, indeed, why do they? Do we want to make claims about the 
real world in which we live, well, then we have to start using assumptions and models that we 
at least believe are true. Starting – as most economists do today – with assumptions that we 
make for mathematical tractability reasons and which no one believes are in any sense true, 
is a non-starter that only perpetuates endless and totally irrelevant model exercises that 
makes up such a big part of economics today. In my view, at least, real-world accuracy 
always beats model rigour and precision. We want to know true things about reality, 
not consistent things about models. The more I think about it, the more I wonder why any 
sane person should be interested in that kind of endless parade of known to be stupid 
models. 
 
But maybe, as you suggest, one has to put a more sociological or psychological view on 
these matters. I know that people, like Marion Fourcade, have tried to explain economists’ 
self-confidence as “intellectuals” and “scientists” from those perspectives. Economists, more 
than any other social scientists, concern themselves with measurable quantities, use 
quantitative methods and mathematics, emulate “real” sciences like physics, and so, of 
course, have to be considered much more “objective” and in possession of higher intellectual 
capabilities than the rest of the “riffraff” social sciences. I have spent forty years within the 
academic economics tribe, and have never been able to understand or share that inflated and 
self-congratulatory superiority view on our discipline. 
 
Sure, I have met a lot of both talented and intelligent economists, but sad to say, talent and 
intelligence are no guarantee for delivering truly interesting and relevant knowledge. They 
publish a lot, are invited to conferences, have highly-paid jobs and are considered to be 
“experts” and “authorities” on almost everything that comes their way. Why? One important 
reason is that economists have been successful in selling the image of themselves as 
knowledgeable truth tellers and “pure” scientists equipped with scientific models and theories 
that are “objective”, “apolitical” and “non-normative”, and that politicians and business leaders 
can use as some kind of cooking recipes or blueprints for solving all kinds of problems they 
may encounter. 
 
To me, however, this is nothing but an example of economics’ pretence-of-knowledge 
syndrome (a term used by Hayek in his Swedish Bank Prize speech and more recently 
popularised by Caballero, 2010). The “econ tribe” (Leijonhufvud, 1973) has become so 
entranced with its own deductive-axiomatic models that it has forgotten that there is an all-
important difference between the rigour and precision they manage to achieve in their models 
and the real-world in which policymakers and politicians have to apply these models. In the 
“econ” models, all uncertainty can be reduced to calculable risk, all actors have rational 
expectations, and they always optimize. Reality, however, is different. More complex. 
Genuine uncertainty is everywhere, people are not “rational”, and do not always optimize. 
Although economists think they are in possession of relevant knowledge, trying to use those 
models in that real-world context is not only pointless but also many times harmful and makes 
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a colossal muddle of things. It would indeed be better, as Keynes once said, if economists 
could look upon themselves as humble and competent dentists! 
 
You did also raise a couple of terminological questions about “neoclassical” and “pluralism”, 
so let me say a few words about that. 
 
Looking at what has happened with what we used to call neoclassical theory, it is obvious to 
everyone that it in many respects has become more diverse over time. Most mainstream 
economists today do not characterise themselves as neoclassical, but rather self-identify as 
game theorists, experimental economists, behavioural economists and so forth. But many of 
them share the basic core of the neoclassical tradition out of which these varieties of modern 
economics have emerged. Usually, that is rather unproblematic since, in the context of the 
given discourse, we usually know what it refers to. To me, it has, however, become natural to 
use the term “mainstream economics” and by that I am referring to what I consider the shared 
core of neoclassical economics – the methodological imperative of using mathematical-
deductive-axiomatic methods. You could, of course, argue that the genealogy of the term 
“neoclassical” – going back to Veblen–says something else. But I think somewhere we have 
to accept that terms and concepts live their own lives. That is not a big problem for me, as 
long as you make clear to your readers in what sense you yourself use those terms and 
concepts. Much of what you mention – the new “empirical turn” and the “credibility revolution” 
– has in some ways definitely broadened the scope of economics, but I still think the new 
approaches and sub-disciplines are pervaded with neoclassical thinking and its inherent bias 
towards analytical formalism. It is also for that reason, as I said before, that I think the 
“empirical” transformation of economics is mischaracterized. I can’t really see that it 
constitutes a “paradigm shift”. I look upon it more as an extension of the field of application of 
economics. 
 
There has long been a need for more pluralism in economics, on that most heterodox 
economists agree (see for example, Lee and Cronin, 2016; Jo et al, 2018). The question, 
however, is what kind of pluralism. Here my view is that what we need is not so much more of 
different theories and models, but rather methodological pluralism. That kind of pluralism 
would also open-up a much needed philosophical and science-theoretical awareness. 
 
In mathematics, the deductive-axiomatic method has worked just fine. To reiterate because 
this bears repeating, science is not mathematics. Conflating those two domains of knowledge 
has been one of the most fundamental mistakes made in economics.  There is no way you 
can relevantly analyse economic phenomena as a purely logical relation between hypothesis 
and evidence. In economics, we have to argue and try to substantiate our beliefs and 
hypotheses with reliable evidence. Deductive inferences are purely analytical and it is this 
truth-preserving nature of deduction that makes it different from all other kinds of reasoning. 
But it is also its limitation, since truth in the deductive context does not refer to a real-world 
ontology, and it is totally non-ampliative – the output of the analysis is already given by the 
input. 
 
Instead of this insistence on using mathematics and the deductive kind of inference I would 
rather see economics orient as more of an abductive science. Using abduction we infer 
something based on what would be the best explanation of data given some contextual 
background assumptions. We start with a body of (purported) data and search for 
explanations that can account for the data. Having the best explanation means that you, given 
the context-dependent background assumptions, have a satisfactory explanation that can 
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explain facts better than any other competing explanation – and so it is reasonable to 
consider the hypothesis to be true. Even if we do not have deductive certainty, our abductive 
reasoning gives us a license to consider our belief in the hypothesis as reasonable. This, of 
course, does not mean that we cannot be wrong. Abductions are fallible inferences. The 
premises do not logically entail the conclusion. But if the abductive arguments put forward are 
strong enough, they can be warranted and give us justified true belief, and hence, knowledge. 
As economists we sometimes – much like Sherlock Holmes and other detectives that use 
abductive reasoning – experience temporary delusion. We thought that we had reached a 
strong abductive conclusion by ruling out the alternatives in the set of contrasting 
explanations. But what we thought was true turned out to be false. That does not necessarily 
mean that we had no good reasons for believing what we believed. If we cannot live with that 
contingency and uncertainty, well, then we’re in the wrong business. If it is deductive certainty 
you are after, rather than the ampliative and defeasible reasoning in abduction – well, then 
get into math or logic, not economics. 
 
I know that mainstream economists do not want to make this methodological change, 
because then they would have to give up their dream of building a “rigorous” and “precise” 
science on a par with physics. They do not want to admit that there are severe limits to 
formalism. I am a pluralist and wouldn’t dream of saying that we should have none of that. 
Like Keynes when he criticized Tinbergen, I say: let them go on with their modelling and 
methods. But there has to be an end to the insistence that you must work within the 
constraints of the mathematical-deductivist frame. The mathematisation of economics since 
more than seventy years now has made these economists more or less obsessed with their 
formal-deductive-axiomatic models. Confronted with the critique that they do not solve real 
problems, they often react as Saint-Exupéry’s Great Geographer, who, in response to the 
questions posed by The Little Prince, says that he is too occupied with his scientific work to 
be able to say anything about reality. Sure, modern mainstream economics is in some sense 
“rigorous” – but if it’s rigorously wrong, who cares?  Method and theory pluralism shouldn’t be 
an end in themselves, but instead of making formal logical argumentation based on 
deductive-axiomatic models the message, I think we are better served by economists who – 
like dentists – try to contribute to solving real problems. As John Maynard Keynes (allegedly) 
stated – “It is better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.” 
 
Jamie: OK, there is a consistent theme here that underpins much of what you say and that 
anyone familiar with your work would recognize. And I expect most readers of RWER have 
great sympathy with the general framing and direction of travel of your comments. But, in the 
spirit of critique it is also worth considering whether a consistent theme has a consistent 
analogue. One might, for example, wonder how far non-mainstream economists exhibit the 
desirable characteristics you state (abductive reasoning, limited or contextual use of rigorous 
deductive-analytical methods, emphasis on evidence, commitment to realism, methodological 
pluralism, an open–minded approach to alternatives etc.). For example, to what degree would 
you characterize post-Keynesians as developing their work based on these kinds of 
characteristics, and, in so far as they do, in what sense has this provided more adequate 
accounts of real economies?   
 
LPS: Well, I think it is fair to say that being a science-theoretical critical realist I find myself 
having a lot in common with several heterodox traditions. I’ve always been interested in 
studying the work of people like Veblen, Commons, Marx, Keynes, Kalecki, Åkerman, 
Davidson, Minsky and (on epistemological issues) Hayek. There’s a common ontological 
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orientation in these economists’ methodological stance that I appreciate. They don’t conflate 
model and reality. 
 
To me, especially in times when scientific relativism is expanding, it is important to keep up 
the claim for not reducing science to a purely discursive level. We must maintain the 
Enlightenment tradition of looking upon science as in the truth business. Science is made 
possible by the fact that there are structures that are durable and are independent of our 
knowledge or beliefs about them. There exists a reality beyond our theories and concepts of it 
(even if social reality is also in some sense concept-dependent). 
 
The problem with modern economics – which to a large extent is nothing but a variety of 
positivist social science – is not that it gives the wrong answers, but rather that in a strict 
sense it does not give answers at all. Its explanatory models presuppose that social reality is 
“closed”, and since social reality is fundamentally “open”, models of that kind cannot explain 
anything about what happens in such a universe. Mainstream economics has to postulate 
closed conditions to make its models operational and then – totally unrealistically – impute 
those closed conditions to society’s real structure. But – the world itself should never be 
conflated with the knowledge we have of it. Science can only produce meaningful, relevant 
and realist knowledge if it acknowledges the divide between model and reality – and then, 
most importantly, earnestly tries to bridge it! Ultimately this also means my critique of 
mainstream economics is that it doesn’t take that ontological requirement seriously. 
 
When I read post-Keynesian economists I notice most of them share that fundamental realist 
view, and already by doing so actually provide more adequate accounts of real economies 
than does mainstream economics (for example, on methodology, Dow, 1996). Following in 
the footsteps of Keynes, post-Keynesians try to develop an economic theory that does not 
portray monetary economies as if they were barter economies; that does not reduce genuine 
uncertainty to calculable risk; that takes finance and instability seriously; that does not treat 
real historical time as if it was possible to analyse with an ergodicity postulate that more or 
less reduces the future to a repetition of the past.
3
 
 
Money matters. Unemployment is to a large degree involuntary. The future is non-ergodic. To 
me, those views are some of the hallmarks of post-Keynesian theory – a theory that gives a 
far more adequate account of real-world economies than formalistic-deductive-axiomatic 
mainstream economics. 
 
The basic post-Keynesian pillar is the recognition and acceptance of an ontological fact – 
societies and economies are permeated by genuine uncertainty. But in “modern” 
macroeconomics – Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium, New Synthesis, New Classical 
and “New Keynesian” – the variables used in the models are treated as if drawn from a known 
“data-generating process” that unfolds over time. “Modern” macroeconomics obviously did not 
anticipate the enormity of the problems that unregulated “efficient” financial markets created. 
Why? Because it builds on the myth of us knowing the “data-generating process” and that we 
can describe the variables of our evolving economies as drawn from an urn containing 
stochastic probability functions with known means and variances. Some macroeconomists, 
however, still want to be able to use this tool (their “hammer”). So, they decide to pretend that 
the world looks like a nail, and pretend that uncertainty can be reduced to risk. They construct 
their mathematical models on that assumption. The result: financial crises and economic 
                                                            
3
 Note from Jamie: for a recent post-Keynesian collection on these issues see Dow et al. (2018).  
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havoc.  The most basic lecture post-Keynesian economists – like Minsky and Davidson – 
have taught us is this: trying to cope with an unknown economic future in a way similar to 
playing at the roulette wheel, is a sure recipe for only one thing – economic disaster. 
 
Nowadays there is a lot of discussions about Modern Monetary Theory (MMT). To me – an 
old student of Minsky – that is also a sign of heterodox economics contributing to developing 
economics in the right – realist and relevant – direction.
4
 MMT rejects the traditional Phillips 
curve inflation-unemployment trade-off and has a less positive evaluation of traditional policy 
measures to reach full employment. Instead of a general increase in aggregate demand, it 
usually prefers more “structural” and directed demand measures with less risk of producing 
increased inflation. At full employment deficit spending will often be inflationary, but that is not 
what should decide the fiscal position of the government. The size of public debt and deficits 
is not – as already Abba Lerner argued with his “functional finance” theory in the 1940s – a 
policy objective. The size of public debt and deficits are what they are when we try to fulfil our 
basic economic objectives – full employment and price stability. That government can spend 
whatever amount of money they want is a fact. That does not mean that MMT says they 
ought to – that’s something our politicians have to decide. No MMTer denies that too much of 
government spending can be inflationary. What is questioned is that government deficits are 
necessarily inflationary. 
 
Take Sweden, for example. In my country, as in so many other countries, neoliberal “norm 
politics” invaded the economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The mantra was that it was high time 
for Sweden to follow in the footsteps of Thatcher and Reagan. Deregulate the economy – 
especially the financial markets – and make the central bank independent, so that one could 
concentrate economic policies on inflation-targeting rather than on low unemployment, then 
Sweden would prosper. Today we have a Finance Minister that still keeps on talking about 
how necessary it is to balance the budget. And that in a situation where the deficit is at its 
lowest in 40 years and still falling!
5
 
 
What MMT shows, is how harmful this penny pinching really is. The Swedish experience 
illustrates how a government’s ability to conduct an “optimal” public debt policy may be 
negatively affected if public debt becomes too small. To guarantee a well-functioning 
secondary market in bonds it is essential that the government has access to a functioning 
market. If turnover and liquidity in the secondary market become too small, increased volatility 
and uncertainty will, in the long run, lead to an increase in borrowing costs. Ultimately there’s 
even a risk that market makers would disappear, leaving bond market trading to be operated 
solely through brokered deals. As a kind of precautionary measure against this eventuality, it 
may be argued – especially in times of financial turmoil and crises – that it is necessary to 
increase government borrowing and debt to ensure – in the longer run – good borrowing 
preparedness and a sustained bond market. 
 
Jamie: We’ve travelled some distance here and touched on a lot of subjects that we could 
probably discus at much greater length. For example, following themes central to post-
Keynesian work on money economies, the significance of how the majority of money is 
created and what it is actually created through and for. That is, bank money generated from 
                                                            
4
 Noting, of course, that there is debate within post-Keynesian and structural Keynesian circles 
regarding the originality and adequacy of MMT – Paul Davidson and Thomas Palley are to different 
degree sceptics.  For example, contrast Davidson (2017) and Wray (2015).    
5
 Note from Jamie: Belfrage and Kallifatides (2018) provides an interesting contemporary analysis of 
some of the issues.  
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borrowing, principally for the production and trading of financial assets rather than as a by-
product of primary productive investment (see McLeay et al, 2014; Kumhof and Zoltan, 2015). 
It strikes me that post-Keynesians have had far more insightful things to say regarding this, 
financialisation, credit cycles etc. than most others. Still, there remains some obscurity 
regarding what money “is”, if one wanted to explore this at the most basic level of 
conceptualization via ontology. For example, is it appropriate to advocate a “credit theory of 
money” or is this more accurately phrased as a “theory of credit money”? Is it that all money 
must be credit or is it that money as we know it is typically positioned as a credit relation but 
need not be so? This is a question I have been thinking about recently having read Tony 
Lawson in debate with Geoff Ingham on this (see Lawson, 2019; Ingham, 2018). Lawson is 
one of the if not the prime mover in rehabilitating philosophy (as ontology) in and for 
contemporary economics (see Fullbrook, 2009; Morgan and Patomäki, 2017). He seems to 
be someone you have a lot of time for. As a way to sign off, how would you place your work 
and influences in terms of his and other methodologists?                   
 
LPS: I think it is natural for someone like me – a critical realist – to embrace post-
Keynesianism. But there are, of course, different varieties of realism and different views on 
how to relate to the object of study. If you take Tony Lawson and, for example, Uskali Mäki, 
they obviously share a common interest in analysing the ontological assumptions – explicitly 
or implicitly – made in the modelling strategies used by economists (see for example, 
Lawson, 2015; Mäki, 2013, 2001). But where Mäki is mostly focused on performing a 
traditional, rather  “detached” academic analysis, Lawson also  – like myself – is more openly 
critical of the state of “modern” economics and wants to actively contribute to change the 
direction of economics. 
 
Lawson and Mäki are both highly influential contemporary proponents of economic 
methodology and philosophy. Next to Nancy Cartwright and Kevin Hoover, I guess they are 
those contemporary methodologists I have learned most from. Although to a certain degree, 
probably also a question of “temperament”, I find Lawson’s critique of mainstream economic 
theories and models deeper and more convincing than Mäki’s more “distanced” and less 
critical approach. Mäki’s “detached” style probably reflects the fact that though he is trained in 
economics he works as a philosopher with an interest in economics, rather than as an 
economist (whilst Lawson remained in an economics department at Cambridge). Being an 
economist myself it is easier to see the relevance of Lawson’s ambitious and far-reaching 
critique of mainstream economics than it is to value Mäki’s sometimes rather arduous 
application of the analytic-philosophical tool-kit, typically less ambitiously aiming for mostly 
conceptual and terminological “clarifications.” 
 
Just to round off this interview a little, let me say some words about the future of economics. 
 
Contrary to people like Dani Rodrik – who totally dismisses calls for methodological pluralism 
in economics and think that, just because the “smorgasbord” has grown with the (alleged) 
“empirical turn” in economics, we have had a tremendous paradigm-shift in economics – I 
would rather argue that this continuing insistence on using only a deductive mathematical 
framework for approaching economic issues is a strong sign of how limited the change in 
mainstream economics really has been. From a methodological point of view, the message is 
still “business as usual.” 
 
From my own point of view, I think it is safe to say that if economics is going to be a relevant 
and useful project in the future it will have to redirect its present underlying methodology and 
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philosophy. Although very much in favour of the quest from economics students for more 
pluralism and the need for more and different theories and models, I don’t think that is 
enough. The cut has to go deeper! Economics has to get back to being – as in the 19th 
century – more than just an “intellectual exercise” and reorient itself into being a real-world 
science. It has to become aware of and accept, the limits of analysis set by ontological facts. 
The world is, to a large extent, a complex, open, evolving, genuinely uncertain, emergent, 
non-ergodic, nonhomogeneous, and organic totality. Mainstream economics has refused to 
earnestly reflect on what these impregnable facts do to our possibilities of making relevant 
models and analyses. Instead, they have contented themselves with building toy models of 
ideal non-existent worlds. Going on just refining that project will not constitute a real advance. 
To progress, economics has to totally re-evaluate the basic premises of that modelling 
strategy. If not, economics will remain a useless “intellectual exercise.” 
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